

Message Text

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43

ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-14 AID-20 DRC-01 /169 W

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P R 181220Z OCT 73

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1654

INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMCONSUL KARACHI

AMCONSUL LAHORE

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

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8. APPEARS FROM HERE THAT DAUD REGIME, FOR WHATEVER REASONS OF STRONGLY HELD ETHNIC AFFINITY OR OF DOMESTIC POLITICS OR PSYCHOLOGY, HAS EMBARKED ON A COURSE THAT HAS POTENTIAL FOR SERIOUSLY UPSETTING PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN SUB-CONTINENT (SEE REF D FOR EARLIER EXPRESSION OF OUR CONCERN THIS POINT.). AFGHANISTAN BY ITSELF WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE LITTLE CAPACITY TO DO MORE THAN CREATE SOME HEADACHES FOR GOP BY SUCH MEANS AS ENCOURAGING SUBVERSION IN MINORITY PROVINCES. BUT POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF USSR, OR PERHAPS INDIA, WOULD BE ANOTHER MATTER. IN OASIS REGARD, WE HAVE NOTED HONORIFICATION BY AFGHAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER THAT ARRIVAL OF SOVIET MILITARY MISSION IN KABUL THIS WEEK IS PRELUDE TO EXPECTED MAJOR BUILDUP OF AFGHAN MILITARY POTENTIAL.

9. WHATEVER THE ACTUAL OUTCOME OF CURRENT SOVIET MILITARY MISSION TO AFGHANISTAN, VERY FACT OF NEW SOVIET INJECTION AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME IS BOUND TO BE TAKEN BY GOP AS CONFIRMING ITS PROFESSED CONCERN OVER SOVIET INTENTIONS
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IN SOUTH ASIA. NOT UNLIKELY THAT THIS WILL BE ANOTHER FACTOR CITED TO US BY GOP IN ITS EFFORTS TO GET US TO MODIFY OUR CURRENT ARMS SUPPLY POLICY. BEYOND THAT, IMPLICATIONS WOULD BE SERIOUS SHOULD ANY PROMISE OR EXPECT-

TATION OF ACTIVE SOVIET BACKING ENCOURAGE GOA TO ACTIONS (NOT ONLY WORDS) WHICH GOP WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER AS REQUIRING DIRECT REACTION.

10. AS TO CURRENT PAK POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT GOP WISHES AMICABLE RELATIONS WITH KABUL AND IS WILLING TO BE QUITE FORTHCOMING IN ACHIEVING THEM. AFGHANISTAN WAS FIRST COUNTRY VISITED BY BHUTTO AFTER ASSUMING POWER IN DECEMBER 1971. GOP ALSO TOOK SPECIAL MEASURES TO INSURE MINIMUM DISRUPTION OF AFGHAN TRANSIT TRADE THROUGH KARACHI DURING 1971 WAR AND AGAIN DURING RECENT FLOODS. SIMILARLY, GOP PERMITTED AFGHAN TRANSIT TRADE IN FRUIT TO INDIA TO BE RESUMED LAST YEAR ALTHOUGH ALL OTHER COMMERCE WITH INDIA REMAINS SUSPENDED. IN PERIOD PRECEDING DAUD'S COUP, GOP OCCASIONALLY REACTED PEEVISHLY TO PERIODIC AFGHAN PRO-NOUNCEMENTS ON PUSHTUNISTAN, BUT MORE OFTEN TOLERATED THEM QUIETLY AS REFLECTING THE DOMESTIC COMPULSIONS OF FORMER RGA.

11. WE SEE NO EVIDENCE THAT DAUD'S COUP HAS CHANGED GOP'S DESIRE FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN, ALTHOUGH IT LED TO SERIOUS INITIAL MISGIVINGS (SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED AS FAR AS PAKS ARE CONCERNED IN VIEW DAUD'S PREVIOUS PERFORMANCE. FAR AS WE CAN DETERMINE, PAKS ARE STILL PREPARED EXERT EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT GET ALONG WITH DAUD REGIME. THFOE IS NO FLEXIBILITY, HOWEVER, IN THEIR INSISTANCE THAT DURAND LINE IS THE BORDER AND THAT WHAT TAKES PLACE TO THE SOUTH AND EAST OF IT IS ENTIRELY FOR GOP TO DECIDE. IN PRACTICE, PAKS WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING TO LIVE WITH MODERATE LEVEL OF IRRIDENTIST TALK FROM KABUL, BUT RECENT AFGHAN PROPAGANDA CAMPAING-- INCLUDING ATTACK ON PAKISTAN BY AFGHAN REP IN ALGIERS NONALIGNED CONFERENCE-- AND GOA CHARGES OF PAK SUBVERSION MAY BE MOVING GOP TOWARD LIMITS OF ITS TOLERATION IF THEY NOT ALREADY REACHED. ABOVE MENTIONED TROOP DEPLOYMENTS COULD BE MEANT, INTER ALIA, TO SIGNAL THIS FACT TO AFGHANS.

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12. IMPLICATIONS FOR US. THE OVERRIDINGS* ,95 8NGLE CONCERN FOR THE US IN THE CURRENT PAK-AFGHAN DISPUTE IS OVER ITS POTENTION EFFECT ON PEACE AND STABILITY IN THIS REGION OF THE WORLD. WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN, HOWEVER, HOW DIFFICULT IT IS FOR US TO DO ANYTHING TO AFFECT FUNDAMENTALLY THE COURSE OF ACTION ADOPTED BY GOVERNMENTS IN THIS REGION ON MATTERS WHICH THEY CONSIDER OF VITAL INTEREST TO THEM. PRIMIN BHUTTO HAS ASKED US AT LEAST NOT TO DO ANYTHING THAT MIGHT ENCOURAGE THE GOA TO INTERFERE IN PAKISTAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS OR TO ATTEMPT TO CREATE TURBULENCE ON THE PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUE (REF E). WE CONSIDER THAT REQUEST REASONABLE. QUESTION IS WHETHER WE OFFER

ANY ENCOURAGEMENT TO GOA BY RECEIVING ITS REQUESTS FOR US
TO MAKE DEMARCHES ON ITS BEHALF WITH GOP, ESPECIALLY IF
GOA IS LEFT IN ANY DOUBT THAT OUR OWN INTEREST IN PEACE
IN THIS REGION HAS CERTAIN LINKAGE WITH OUR RECOGNITION
OF THE NORMALLY ACCEPTED INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN. WE RECOGNIZE THE DIFFICULTIES
INHERENT IN ADOPTING FAIRLY CANDID STANCE VIS-A-VIS GOA
ON THIS MATTER, AS EMBASSY KABUL HAS ELOQUENTLY REPORTED
IN THE PAST COUPLE OF MONTHS. BUT THE PROBLEM REMAINS.
AS FOR PAKISTAN, WE HAVE TOLD BHUTTO HOW IMPORTANT WE
BELIEVE IT IS FOR PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS TO REMAIN PEACEFUL
(AND ALSO FRIENDLY AND (#)

OF THE DISA
ADVANTAGES OF HIS POLICY IN DEALING WITH THE NAP LEADER-
SHIP IN NWFP AND BALUCHISTAN, WHICH WITH CONSIDERABLE
JUSTIFICATION HE
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CONSIDERS TO BE A MATTER WITHIN PAKISTAN'S
DOMESTIC COMPETENCE.

13. WE BELIEVE OUR EXISTING POLICY OF NOT GETTING IN THE
MIDDLE BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN ON THESE MATTERS
IS THE RIGHT ONE AND SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. ONE ASPECT
OF THIS IS THAT WE SHOULD NOT AGREE TO CONVEY MESSAGES
BETWEEN THE GOA AND GOP, WHETHER THE REQUEST ORIGINATES
IN KABUL OR ISLAMABAD. LET THEM USE THEIR OWN CHANNELS.

14. THE CURRENT TIMING IS PROBABLY NOT RIGHT BECAUSE OF
THE MIDDLE EAST WAR. BUT WE MIGHT SEEK AN APPROPRIATE
OCCASION TO ENGAGE THE SOVIETS IN A DISCUSSION ABOUT

CURRENT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN WHICH
COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN A NEW UPSET TO STABILITY IN
SOUTH ASIA. WE ASSUME THE SOVIETS WOULD EXPRESS A
COMMON INTEREST WITH US IN MAINTAINING PEACE IN THIS REGION.
POSSIBLY THEY MIGHT PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN THIS REGARD,
PARTICULARLY IN KABUL, IF THEY WERE INDEED INCLINED TO
DO SO.
SOBER

NOTE BY OC/T: ISLAMABAD 9076 (SEC 2 OF 2) (#) OMISSION.
CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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